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ABSTRACT    We examine the dynamics of Chinese listed SMEs with respect to their 
post-market viability and growth after going public. The Kaplan–Meier estimation shows 
that SMEs are more likely to transition to a non-viable state than large firms. Further 
examination using the Cox model and the random effects model shows that SME 
dynamics are shaped by heterogeneous firm and industry characteristics, as well as the 
underlying financial and institutional environments. SME viability is distinguished by its 
ability to grow through learning along with age, aided by lower business risk, more 
focused business, access to equity finance, and less exposure to competition in remote 
regions. SME growth is constrained by a dispersed ownership structure, insufficient 
infrastructure to protect firms that are active in R&D, and the limited financing role of 
equity markets. The study also reveals that government initiatives in support of strategic 
development in the service industries and in the coastal regions are of importance in 
spurring SME growth. 
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The dynamics of listed SMEs in China 
 
1. Introduction 
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have formed the backbone of every economy 
and served as the key source of economic dynamism and flexibility both in advanced 
industrialized economies and in emerging and developing ones (Oliveira and Fortunato, 
2006). However, many SMEs do not survive their initial years in business due to their 
competitive disadvantages (Altman, 1983) and, as such, cannot provide full benefits to 
society. If they survive, they tend to deliver superior growth compared to their large 
counterparts (Jovanovic, 1982).  
      The dynamics of SMEs have been examined widely. The majority of the studies have 
been conducted based on the hypotheses formulated and explored for firms in mature 
economies and they have reached the consensus that firm attributes, industry characteristics, 
and external conditions are of fundamental importance in explaining SME survival and their 
long-term growth. A growing literature that seeks to understand the SME sector in emerging 
economies examines wider issues concerning firm dynamics by looking at the idiosyncratic 
economic system (Liedholm and Mead, 1999), politics and government policies (Rasiah, 
2002; Nugent and Yhee, 2002) and institutions and infrastructure (Beck et al., 2002). It 
concludes that a marked difference exists in SME dynamics of mature versus emerging 
economies. However, none of the studies have yet analyzed SMEs in China. 
      Since China embarked on a comprehensive and ambitious economic reform in 1979, the 
SME sector has achieved remarkable growth and helped attain many important socio-
economic objectives. To help SMEs thrive, the Chinese government has initiated a series of 
supporting programs and set up a national network of agencies and institutions, with the 
objective of creating an enabling environment for the SME sector. The priority given to the 
SME sector is highlighted further in the Small and Medium-sized Enterprise Promotion Law 
promulgated in 2003, which specified that government bodies shall establish a system of 
services to legally protect SMEs’ financial interests, in order to underpin the sustainable 
growth of the SME sector. 
      Despite the set of instruments, institutions, and regulations in place, it is widely believed 
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that the development of SMEs has been hampered by institutional obstacles in the financial 
and business environment in which they operate. China practises the bank-based system, 
where the four national commercial banks dominate. Unlike their counterparts in mature 
economies, the Chinese commercial banks are controlled by the central and local 
governments and directed to channel financial resources to favored borrowers that are state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) and strategic industries. They lack operational autonomy in 
making lending decisions on commercial terms. Bank monitoring and screening are, thus, 
seriously undermined. Developing sound and effective corporate governance was not put on 
the agenda until 2006 when the China Banking Regulatory Commission prescribed to the 
banking sector requirements for effective corporate governance. In the meantime, 
decentralization of administrative controls and institutional restructuring were initiated. 
These structural changes and the development of other financial institutions have induced the 
banks to make more viable financing decisions, helped them to channel financial resources to 
a broader range of sectors, including the SME sector, and boosted incentives for financial 
innovation (Liu and Pang, 2009). However, the continued dominance of the state, the 
restricted permissible scope of banking, as well as weak regulation and governance of bank 
institutions remain constant challenges to the continuance and sustainable growth of the SME 
sector. 
      The stock markets were not established until the end of 1991, initially for saving soon-to-
be bankrupt SOEs. Qualified SMEs have since been allowed to file for listing on the Main 
Boards to tap new finance sources. However, strict criteria for market entry have excluded or 
discouraged the majority of qualified SMEs from equity financing. One of the important 
steps forward is that the Shenzhen Stock Exchange formally inaugurated a special board for 
SMEs in May 2004. The SME Board is open to SMEs that have an outstanding main 
business or are innovative high-tech start-ups, to facilitate the financing of those growing 
SMEs that badly need funds, but have few fund-raising channels. According to Yang (2005), 
the average lifespan of SMEs in China is 2.9 years. Publicly listed SMEs are required to 
show a minimum three-year profit record to qualify for market entry. This indicates that 
listed SMEs are the pioneers of the Chinese SME sector. Hereby, these questions arise: does 
being listed provide an unambiguous advantage for SMEs to attain sustainability in the 
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market, and does the current business environment and institutional setting facilitate their 
post-market development after going public? 
      Although previous empirical studies provide valuable insights into SME dynamics, they 
are limited to the firm’s post-entry performance after its inception; little is known about its 
post-market viability and growth and its major constraints after going public. In this study, 
we fill the void. We examine the explicit role of seasoned financing along with the roles of a 
range of explanatory variables relating to heterogeneous firm and industry specifics and 
institutional conditions in the post-market viability and growth of listed SMEs; and seek to 
better understand to what extent market and structural impediments constrain SME dynamics 
after they go public. The dynamics in the study are examined in two dimensions: 1) the 
firm’s likelihood of transition to a non-viable state after market listing, and 2) the firm’s 
after-market growth. The choice of publicly listed firms not only allows us to examine the 
importance of the antecedents mostly discussed in the literature, but also provides us with a 
unique opportunity to assess the financing role of the stock market in SME dynamics – which 
is neglected in the literature – as well as the extent of post-market business risk and agency 
problems associated with the public ownership structure of listed SMEs. 
      This study enriches the literature on firm dynamics by going beyond the traditional size–
age versus survival–growth relationship to demonstrate that access to capital market and 
seasoned financing mechanism, exposures to post-market business risk and agency problems 
associated with dispersed public shareholdings, institutional infrastructure and functions, as 
well as the government’s supportive policies are of vital importance for the development of 
SMEs in an emerging economy where market reforms are only beginning to take hold. While 
the majority of previous studies concern manufacturing, this is one of the very few to study 
all industries and, hence, adds new empirical findings for an emerging economy. We are 
among the first to establish the direct link of cash flow effect and agency effect relating to 
business risk with the firm’s viability and growth after it goes public. The paper’s findings 
carry policy implications that are related to development of the stock market to meet SMEs’ 
demands, improvement of corporate governance mechanisms, enforcement of intellectual 
property protections, and design and implementation of economic policies in support of 
industrial structure adjustments and creation of the favorable locational conditions in the less-
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developed regions. 
 
2. Empirical Evidence on Firm Dynamics 
Firm dynamics have been studied in various disciplines. There has been theoretical support 
and empirical evidence that firm dynamics are determined by the characteristics specific to 
the firm and the industry and the external conditions that are critical to the firm’s continence 
and growth. 
      Theoretical models have developed to show that the underlying firm specifics shape the 
firm dynamics. Jovanovic (1982) models firm survival and growth as a function of the 
efficiency level of a firm. The start-up firm enters the market unsure of its true quality and 
learns about its efficiency through market information on its performance over time. The firm 
that gains the ability to compete through learning will survive along with its size and age. If 
the new firm is able to occupy a niche in the market, it will grow faster than the incumbent 
firms. Jovanovic’s work has challenged the random growth hypothesis, also known as 
Gibrat’s Law, which asserts that growth is unrelated to firm size. Supporting evidence for the 
Jovanovic hypothesis has been found in a rich array of empirical studies on firm dynamics, 
e.g., Evans (1987) on the relationships of firm survival with firm size and age and Audretsch 
et al. (1999) on the interactive effect of size–age on firm growth.  
      Economic research has paid considerable attention to business risk when assessing firm 
dynamics (Bowman, 1980). The Capital Asset Pricing theory proposes that if market 
efficiency exists, business risk has no effect on firm value, as the risk can be diversified away 
by investors. Opponents argue that business risk is central to organizational evolution (Child, 
1972). Uncertainty in investment and operational outcomes can largely increase the 
variability in the firm’s future cash flows and hence reduce its ability to meet fixed charges 
(Bernanke, 1983), leading to a higher probability of default and thereby damaging the firm’s 
chance to grow (Brito and Mello, 1995). The negative earnings shocks can have an adverse 
effect on the firm’s reputation and its business relations with customers, and hamper its 
ability to pursue profitable growth options and realize the full value of its assets (Stulz, 1996). 
However, lower business risk can be negatively linked with firm value. Instead of 
maximizing firm growth, management may seek to maintain a lower level of business risk by 
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opting to under-invest, leading to deterioration in firm value (Amit and Wernerfelt, 1990). 
      The association of firm dynamics with ownership structure has been the subject of an 
important and ongoing debate in the literature. The separation of ownership and control 
creates conflicts of interest between management and shareholders, which has negative 
implications for firm performance and valuation (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Especially 
when ownership is overly dispersed, monitoring can be ineffective and passive (Grossman 
and Hart, 1988), because small, rationally apathetic shareholders have no adequate incentives 
to monitor management closely (Berle and Means, 1932). However, if the investors, such as 
institutional ones, have an adequate incentive to monitor management closely and the ability 
to direct strategic change because of their voting blocks (La Porta et al., 1999), agency 
problems are likely to reduce and firm value is, thus, enhanced. In contrast, Fama (1980) 
proposes that ownership is irrelevant to firm dynamics when the market for control is in 
place and can effectively discipline management discretional behavior and solve incentive 
problems. 
      Industrial literature has provided compelling evidence that industry-specific 
characteristics concerning economies of scale and industry-level innovative activities play 
important roles in determining firm dynamics (Bartoloni and Baussola, 2009). The survival 
rate of new entrants is subject to the degree of economies of scale in the industry where they 
operate. A higher level of the minimum efficient scale level of output required by the 
industry indicates cost disadvantages for the new entrants and lowers their chance of 
surviving in the short run (Acs and Audretsch, 1990) as well as in the long run (Audretsch, 
1991). Nevertheless, the likelihood of survival depends on how rapidly the new entrants 
grow towards the minimum efficient scale level (Audretsch and Mahmood, 1995). Once the 
new entrants are able to survive in the capital-intensive industries, they have a greater 
propensity to grow (Doms et al., 1995). Theoretical models have developed to consider the 
technological environment and regime that can have long-run implications for the ability of 
new value-maximizing firms to innovate and therefore survive (Gort and Klepper, 1982). 
New firms tend to survive in the industries with innovation advantages (Agarwal and 
Audretsch, 2001). The entry accompanied by the breakthrough in knowledge provides the 
new firms with comparative advantages to survive over the incumbents with obsolescent 
  
6
knowledge (Agarwal and Gort, 1996); however, survival varies with technology evolving 
along the industry life cycles (Agarwal and Audretsch, 2001). 
      There is substantial research on the importance of external conditions in determining firm 
dynamics. Many studies focus on the role of external finance and conclude that firm survival 
and growth potential can be seriously constrained by the scarce availability of external 
finance (Zingales, 1998). In the presence of asymmetric information, firm investment is 
unequally financially constrained and liquidity constraints become more severe as firm size 
decreases (Fazzari et al., 1988). Due to the limited access to equity finance, small firms have 
to rely more heavily on bank loans than their larger counterparts. In the face of severe 
adverse selection problems, small firms are excluded from the market, which results in 
valuable investment opportunities being missed (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), thereby limiting 
their ability to grow. The financial market environment is part and parcel of firm dynamics 
too, out of which stock exchange regulations governing the issuance and trading of securities 
as well as operational and informational efficiencies of capital markets are claimed to be the 
most important factors in determining firm growth (González, 2002). Small firms, where 
information asymmetry is substantial, often have difficulty in establishing and maintaining 
liquid and efficient markets for their securities, which adversely affects their growth 
prospects (Enisan and Olufisayo, 2009). 
      A growing literature has developed which examines the ways in which firm dynamics are 
related to location attributes. The economic characteristics of regional markets and 
infrastructure, i.e., proximity to suppliers and customers, research, administrative 
mechanisms, and transport infrastructure, play important roles in firm dynamics (Eickelpasch 
et al., 2007). Regional institutional and cultural factors that attract talent and human capital 
contribute to technological development and productivity in the region, which, in turn, 
influence the survival and growth of new entries (Werner, 2004). Superior access to 
knowledge resources offers the synergy to firm growth too. A location rich in knowledge 
resources is more conducive to firm growth than the one  that is less endowed (Audretsch and 
Dohse, 2007). In contrast, firm dynamics can be disadvantaged by an unfavorable locational 
environment. Inefficient administrative arrangements and market barriers, even in regions 
where market and opportunities are expanding, would hamper firm growth (Czarnitzki and 
  
7
Hottenrott, 2009). Fierce competition can lead to the higher likelihood of firm exit too 
(Hansen et al., 2004). 
      A body of literature has emerged recently that examines the extent to which the 
institutional environment and infrastructure influence firm dynamics. Some country studies 
show that SME dynamics are closely linked with, among others, market conditions and the 
institutional framework of the individual financial system (González, 2002), as well as 
financing environment and legal institutions with the most fundamental aspects pertaining to  
protection of property rights and  enforcement of legal contracts (Beck et al., 2002). In 
summary, the differences in economic, political, and institutional contexts have played 
significant roles in explaining the differentials in SME dynamics across economic systems. 
     In what follows, we rely on the above framework to examine the dynamics of listed SMEs 
in China and discuss the extent to which Chinese listed SMEs fit into the general pattern. 
3. Methodological Issues 
3.1  Survival Analysis Methods 
The stock market in China did not have an exit mechanism until 1998 when the securities 
regulator, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), promulgated the trading 
suspension and delisting rules. The general principle is that if a firm experiences negative net 
profits for two consecutive accounting years, it will receive a delisting risk alert from the 
CSRC. The stock exchange will put its shares under special treatment, and the daily up and 
down limit of its share price will be reduced to 5 percent. If its net profit remains negative for 
a third year, the firm’s shares will be suspended from trading on the Main Board and the firm 
will be delisted from the stock market after the approval of the CSRC. In this study, if a firm 
experiences negative net profits for two consecutive years, it is considered to be in a non-
viable state in the market; otherwise, it remains viable in the market. The rationale of the 
two-year cutoff is that a two-year loss signifies the start of the operational abnormality of a 
listed firm and is the first sign of danger of progression to trading suspension and being 
delisted from the market. We employ statistical methods for survival data analysis, the 
recurrent Kaplan–Meier Procedure (Kaplan and Meier, 1958; Peña et al., 2001) and the Cox 
model with counting process (Cox, 1972; Andersen and Gill, 1982), to estimate the firm’s 
propensity to transition to a non-viable state and identify the factors that determine the 
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transition of SMEs in comparison to large firms (control group). The survival analysis 
methods allow us to track the effects of potential factors on the firm’s post-market viability 
over its entire time profile after going public. 
 
Kaplan–Meier Estimation Method 
The Kaplan–Meier (KM) estimation method provides a descriptive view of a firm’s 
propensity of transitioning to a non-viable state by modeling time-to-event data. The KM 
method takes into account the time to the first hazard event, and counts the firms at risk at the 
time of the event. The event in this study is defined as a firm being loss-making in net profit 
for two consecutive years, and the risk set is defined as a collection of the firms that are at 
risk of making such a loss at a certain point in time since listing on the stock market. The 
recurrent KM procedure generates step-function estimates of survival for each point in time 
at which an event occurs or recurs. Let ∞<<<< rtt L10  be the observed, ordered failure 
times. The estimator, )(ˆ tS , is expressed as  
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −= Π
<
*
*
1)(ˆ
j
j
ttj R
E
tS
j
           (1) 
where *jE  represents the number of event occurrences or recurrences at time ,jt  and 
*
jR  
represents the number of firms at risk at time .,,1, rjt j K=  Equation 1 estimates the firm’s 
likelihood of transitioning to a non-viable state based on the individual firm’s information at 
time jt  and prior periods by calculating the probability of an occurring or recurrent event. 
Each firm enters the risk in the year when it is listed on the stock market, and ends when it is 
delisted from the stock market or at the end of 2008, when the survival time is censored. If an 
event occurs, all the recurrences during the follow-up period are taken into account.  
   The estimation results are displayed as recurrent Kaplan–Meier curves, where the survival 
rates are plotted against the years since listing. The Breslow test of homogeneity is then 
applied to test whether the survival pair distributions of SMEs and large firms are equal. 
 
Cox Proportional Hazard Regression Model 
The Kaplan–Meier estimation, while informative, does not enable us to examine the factors 
that may account for the heterogeneous propensity of transitioning to a non-viable state of the 
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firms of different sizes.  
   The Cox proportional hazard regression model is a multivariate survival method widely 
used in failure time studies. The baseline hazard function assumes one time event per firm. 
Andersen and Gill (1982) extend the Cox model to take account of multiple events, 
henceforth the Cox model with counting process. The counting process allows firms to 
experience multiple events by entering and leaving the risk set at any number of points in 
time, while keeping them on the same baseline hazards. The formulation of the counting 
process proposed by Andersen and Gill (1982) can be written as 
)()()( )(0
'
tYett i
tX
i
iβλλ = ,   ni ...,,1=     (2) 
where )}(),{( Xttλ  denotes the resultant hazard of firm i with the time interval [0, t], given 
the values of the covariates for the respective case in X; ),...,()( ,1, niii YYtY =  is the 
multivariate indicator process, referred to as the censoring process, with 1)( =tYi  if the ith 
firm has an occurrence or recurrence of loss-making at time t since the year of listing or 
0)( =tYi  otherwise; and the term )(0 tλ  is the baseline hazard for the respective firm when all 
explanatory variable values are equal to zero. Hazard ratio (HR) per unit increase in )(tX i  is 
estimated as 
'βe , and β  is the regression coefficient. In this repeated event context, the 
observations are assumed to be independent of each other for a given firm. However, it is 
likely that the chance of the firm experiencing loss-making is dependent on any earlier losses 
that have occurred. Hence, the standard errors will be adjusted for robustness to account for 
the dependence of observations within the firm over time. A negative coefficient on the HR, 
1<HR , indicates that the explanatory variable is associated with the higher probability of 
viability in the firm. A positive coefficient, 1>HR , suggests that the explanatory variable 
accelerates the occurrence or recurrence of loss-making in the firm and hence it has a greater 
likelihood of transitioning to a non-viable state. When the estimated HR is unity, the 
explanatory variable has no influence on the viability of the firm. 
 
3.2  Panel Data Analysis of Firm Growth 
This study applies the panel data analysis technique to examine post-market growth of SMEs. 
The general econometric model is specified below. 
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tititititi XGrowthGrowth ,,1,0, εααββ +++++= −                 (3)  
where tiGrowth ,  is the growth rate for firm i at time t; X is a vector of antecedents; tα  and iα  
represent time effect and unobserved heterogeneity of the ith firm respectively; and tε  is a 
white noise error term. To examine the dynamic property of this equation, we add the lagged 
dependent variable, ,1, −tiGrowth  to control for the endogenous determination of firm growth 
(Caselli et al., 1996). iα  can be treated as a fixed parameter over time, in which case the ith 
intercept is ia+0β  as in the fixed effects estimation. We can also treat iα  as a random 
parameter, with the assumption that the intercept is a random outcome variable that is a 
function of a mean value plus a random error. Hence, a composite error term is formed as 
tiitiv ,, εα += . Because iα  is in the composite error in each time period t, the error term, vi,t, 
can be serially correlated with any of the explanatory variables across the periods in the 
estimation. The Hausman specification test is used for orthogonality that the individual 
effects are uncorrelated with the regressors in the model, that is, 0)( , =tii XE α , assuming 
other model assumptions are met (Hausman, 1978). If H0 is rejected, the fixed effects model 
is estimated. If H0 is accepted, the random effects model is favored over the fixed effects 
model as it has a more efficient estimator and is statistically justifiable to be estimated. 
 
3.3 Data 
In examining the dynamics of listed SMEs, we employ the full history of annual panel data 
of the firms listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in the 
period 1991–2008.1 The firms are of different sizes and are distributed across 12 types of 
industry excluding banking and insurance. All the firms, including suspended and delisted 
ones, are included. The final sample for this analysis comprises 1,582 firms. The expected 
relationship of firm dynamics with a set of variables relating to firm attributes, industry 
specifics, and external conditions and the theory behind each characteristic are discussed 
below. The definitions are summarized in Table 1. 
                                                 
1. We employed the Seasoned Equity Offerings Database, China’s Bond Market Database, China’s Stock 
Market Database, and the Accounting Research Database developed by the Centre for China Financial 
Research of the University of Hong Kong and Guo Tai An Information Technology Company. The Sinofin 
Database, developed by Beijing University, supplied the ownership database. The National Bureau of 
Statistics of China supplied the annual industry-specific GDP growth index. 
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Insert Table 1 here. 
      The first group of variables are the key variables specific to the firm. Firm size is closely 
correlated with firm dynamics. Small firms have limited resource in terms of finance, 
technology, and personnel but higher risk in operations, and hence are less able to achieve 
economies of scale rendering them competitive in the market (Aaby and Slater, 1989). In the 
extreme case, they are forced out of the market. Once small firms secure a niche in their 
respective markets, they tend to grow faster than their large counterparts (Jovanovic, 1982). 
We would, therefore, expect that size is positively related to firm viability but negatively 
related to firm growth. Start-up size is used to enable us to link firm dynamics to its ability to 
attract financial resources (Persson, 2004) and to the cost disadvantage of confronting the 
small start-ups that typically operate at a sub-optimal scale of output (Evans, 1987), which, in 
turn, determine its ability to survive and grow. To test the size effect, we classify the firms in 
accordance with the size classification jointly issued by the State Economic and Trade 
Commission, the State Planning Commission, the Ministry of Finance, and the National 
Bureau of Statistics. A firm is classified as an SME if it meets one of these two criteria: 1) 
the firm is officially listed on the SME Board of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange; 2) the total 
number of shares outstanding is less than 200,000,000 and the total number of tradable shares 
outstanding is less than 50,000,000; otherwise it is a large firm. This classification is also 
adopted by the SME Board. Firm size is defined as being equal to 1 if a firm is small and 
medium-sized, or 0 if it is large. Large firm size is used as the reference size. 
      Firms evolve with age. Young firms have a high mortality rate, but the rate declines as 
they age and turn competitive (Jovanovic, 1982). Chinese listed firms, small or large, are 
generally young. The history of listed firms can only be traced back to the experiment with 
corporatization, which began in 1984. To be listed on the stock market, the enterprises are 
required to restructure themselves into shareholding companies before being considered for 
listing by the CSRC. In December 1990, the two stock exchanges started off tentatively with 
medium-sized SOEs mainly operating in the traditional industries. An increasing number of 
firms were incorporated and went public from 1998. These new incorporations tended to be 
large-scale firms or blue chips operating in the strategic industries or holding the leading 
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position in their respective industries. With the set-up of the SME Board in 2004, SMEs with 
high growth prospects and leadership in their own line of business were also incorporated 
and 38 of them were approved for listing on the SME Board. This number increased to 277 at 
the end of 2008. In view of the specific age spectrum of listed firms, we expect younger 
incorporated firms to have better growth prospects than their relatively older counterparts, 
especially in SMEs, in that if an SME is incorporated and qualified for listing, it 
demonstrates that it has gained strength through learning (Jovanovic, 1982) to attract 
financial resources, which, in turn, signifies its strong capacity to grow. However, it is also 
likely that the age effect is indistinguishable, as listed firms in China are, in general, young. 
Age is defined as the attained age representing the lifetime of a firm in each calendar year. 
      The firm’s post-market growth represents its capacity to sustain the underlying operations 
and growth potential after going public. A smaller firm with a higher growth rate would have 
a better chance of surviving, as “The superior endowments of a firm, reflected in its ability to 
grow, increase the probability of survival” (Agarwal, 1997). We define the post-market 
growth rate as the annual growth rate in total assets of firm i in year t after going public and 
expect a positive effect of this variable on firm viability. As this study covers 18 years from 
1991 to 2008, the firm’s investment and operating activities may have been affected by the 
ups and downs in the economy. To account for the possible effect of economic fluctuations, 
the variable is derived after adjusting the calendar-year and industry-specific GDP growth 
index. This variable is also used as the independent variable in the post-market growth 
analysis. 
      Business risk can determine which organizations survive and grow and which decline and 
die (Summer, 1980). An increasing level of business risk can largely increase uncertainty in 
the firm’s projections of future incomes and hence reduce its ability to meet debt obligations 
(Bernanke, 1983), leading to a higher probability of not surviving. So we refer to this effect 
as the cash flow effect. On the other hand, a lower level of business risk may be the 
consequence of managerial deliberation to maintain a stable earnings stream through 
incurring agency costs, thereby damaging firm growth. We refer to this effect as the agency 
effect. We measure business risk as the standard deviation of the residual term ti,ε  in the 
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market model, which is expressed by  
titmtititi RR ,,,,, εβα ++=                         (4) 
where tiR ,  is the individual return of security with cash dividend reinvested of firm i in year t, 
and tmR ,  is the equally weighted market return with cash dividend reinvested in year t. We 
posit that business risk is negatively related to firm viability. Higher business risk increases 
the likelihood of the firm’s transition to a non-viable state, given uncertainty in generating 
returns. Business risk is positively linked with firm growth, given the risk–return relationship. 
If management choose to under-invest in order to reduce business risk, firm growth decreases 
as a consequence.  
      A unique feature of Chinese listed firms is the dual ownership structure represented by 
tradable shares, i.e., public shares, and non-tradable shares, including state shares and legal-
person shares. Although different classes of shares have the same claim rights and voting 
power, their holders differ in the motivation of monitoring managerial behavior in alignment 
with shareholders’ interests. Listed SMEs are predominated by public shareholdings. The 
vast majority of public investors are minority shareholders holding a negligible amount of 
shares. They lack adequate incentives to monitor management closely, and public 
shareholder passivity is, thus, inevitable. Additionally, almost no individual shareholders sit 
on the board of directors or on the supervisory committee (Xu and Wang, 1999). They would 
face significant hurdles when seeking to assert their rights within the corporate system. 
Furthermore, there is no sufficient market infrastructure for legal protection of shareholders’ 
rights due to unclearly defined property rights. We hypothesize that the overly dispersed 
public ownership structure in SMEs would discourage the shareholders from restraining 
managers’ prerogative discretions and dealing with misconduct of dominant shareholders and, 
hence, have negative implications for SME dynamics. 
      Non-state legal-person ownership holds second position in the SMEs’ ownership 
structure. Different from public shareholdings, there is a broader range of monitoring devices 
under non-state legal-person shareholdings. Non-state legal-person shareholders, who are 
institutional investors, elect the representatives to the board of directors and the supervisory 
committee to protect their interests (Sun and Tong, 2003). They also specialize in gathering 
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and interpreting sophisticated information on firms (Grier and Zychowicz, 1994). Hence, 
they have more incentive and capability to monitor the implementation of corporate 
strategies, change the management team, and discipline incumbent management in the wake 
of performance decline or in the presence of managerial entrenchment. Our corresponding 
hypothesis is that institutional shareholdings are positively associated with SME dynamics. 
      State ownership is derived from the legacy of the centrally commended economy and is 
intrinsically ambiguous (Driffield and Du, 2007). In principle, state shares are owned by 
every Chinese citizen. In reality, government bureaucrats represent their interests and act as 
the principal, but they are not legally entitled to residual incomes. Bureaucrats select top 
managers, who are politically or personally linked with them, and delegate the control rights 
over operations, assets, and cash flows to management. Under such corporate governance 
arrangements that do not serve the purpose of safeguarding firm value, managerial incentives 
are skewed to maximize personal benefits or pursue political goals, leading to substantial 
agency problems (Shleifer, 1998). As state shares account for the least ownership of SMEs 
(see Table 3), we posit that the likely negative effect should be modest or insignificant on 
SME survival and growth but large and significant for large firms that are dominated by state 
ownership. The three classes of ownership are measured as the percentage of total shares 
outstanding within a firm. They consist of tradable A-shares, non-state legal-person shares, 
and state shares, respectively. State ownership consists of state shares and state legal-person 
shares.   
      The second group of determinants relates to industry specifics. The type of business in 
which a firm operates determines the firm dynamics (Audretsch and Mahmood, 1995). The 
common observation is that the more capital intensive the industry in which a small firm 
operates, the less chance it has of surviving. If the small firm is able to survive, it will have 
experienced extraordinary growth (Audretsch, 1995). The real sector in China was long 
characterized by the government’s industry policies targeting strategic industries in the pre-
reform period. Since the 1980s, the government has aspired to promote a multi-tiered 
industrial structure with the objective of improving the competitiveness of Chinese industries, 
and the industry policies have been gradually geared towards supporting the tertiary 
industries in which SMEs actively operate. Furthermore, the industry-level technological 
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activities and the innovative environment influence the general conditions for firm survival 
(Agarwal and Audretsch, 2001). The firm-specific strengths of dealing with external changes 
are consolidated during the process of R&D and innovative activities (Christensen and Caves, 
1997). The Chinese government attaches great importance to the development of SMEs and 
provides policy support to encourage SMEs to engage in R&D and technological innovation. 
SME innovation has been taking place, and innovative SMEs are playing a pivotal role in 
leading the development of the SME sector. However, the role of R&D and innovative 
activities can be undermined by the prevalence of copyright infringement and weak 
institutional protections of innovative and R&D-active firms. Trademark counterfeiting and 
piracy are the most common intellectual property rights violations in China. Innovative and 
R&D firms often find their new products copied very quickly. The laxness of copyright 
enforcement by local authorities has exacerbated the piracy problems, allowing staggeringly 
high piracy rates and massive losses for these firms. 
      To test the industry-specific effect, we classify the firms into 12 industries in accordance 
with the four-digit CSRC Guidelines on Business Classification promulgated in May 2001. 
Of these industries, the innovative high-tech and R&D sector include firms within section G 
(Information Technology), firms in the innovative high-tech sub-sectors of Manufacturing 
within division C5 (Electronics) and division C8 (Medicine and Biological Products), and 
firms in Social Services within division K20 (Professional, Scientific Research Services). We 
assign 12 industry dummy variables to represent each of the industries (see Table 1 for 
details). Agriculture is used as the reference industry. On average, agricultural establishments 
are labour-intensive with less capital commitment, and one can assume that there are fewer 
economies of scale in the industry. We hypothesize that SMEs in the service industries are 
more likely to survive and those in the capital-intensive industries are more likely to grow. 
We also expect that the governmental policies and supports that have vigorously promoted 
productivity and independent technological innovation of SMEs in the last two decades have 
effectively contributed to SME dynamics. Given the extent of copyright infringement and the 
resulting impairment on the market value of R&D and innovation outputs, it is likely that 
industry-level innovative high-tech and R&D activities have less effect on SME growth than 
would otherwise be expected. 
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      The third group of determinants includes variables describing the external environment 
that may influence firm dynamics. SMEs need capital in order to finance their growth and 
expansion, and a lack of financial resources is a major impediment to their development 
(Carpenter and Petersen, 2002). To help ease SME finance, qualified SMEs have been 
allowed to float on the Main Boards of the two stock exchanges since 1991. In 2004, the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange officially inaugurated the SME Board targeting the emerging 
SMEs with outstanding main business or innovative advantages. However, the seasoned 
issue requirements that apply to large firms unanimously apply to SMEs too2. Many SMEs 
find it difficult to meet such criteria at the early stages of their development. According to 
our data set, 53 percent of large firms meet the criteria, while only 16 percent of SMEs 
qualify. In addition, the issue procedure is lengthy and costly, and can take up to two to three 
years to complete. Furthermore, the convertible bond market is virtually non-existent for 
SMEs, as convertible bond issues are only targeted at large firms3. Given these constraints, 
we postulate that the role of seasoned financing in firm dynamics is limited and the capital 
market may have failed to fulfill the financing role that it would normally be thought to 
assume in providing much-needed finance to listed SMEs. The variable representing 
seasoned financing, expressed as the ratio of gross proceeds raised through rights issues, cash 
offers, and convertible bonds conducted by firm i in year t over its market capitalization at 
the accounting year end preceding the issue, is included to test whether equity finance is of 
significance in firm dynamics, shedding light on the financing role of the equity market in 
sustaining firm growth. 
      The economic value of location serves as a conduit for higher rates of firm growth 
                                                 
2.  According to the Provisional Regulation on Rights Issues by Listed Companies promulgated in 1993 and 
revised in 1994, 1996 and 1999 and the Measures for the Administration of Offerings of New Shares by Listed 
Companies promulgated in 2001 and revised in 2006, SMEs must meet the following criteria to be eligible 
for rights issues or cash offers: 1) the company must have been continuously profitable for the last three 
accounting years; 2) the weighted averaged ROE should be no less than 10 percent in the last three 
accounting years and no less than 6 percent in the year preceding the intended issue; 3) the shares in the 
previous issue must have been fully subscribed and there must have been at least a 12-month interval between 
any two issues. 
3.  Based on the Interim Measures for the Administration of Issuance of Convertible Bonds by Listed Companies 
promulgated in 1997 and revised in 2001 and 2006, a firm needs to meet the following requirements to 
qualify for the convertible issue: 1) the minimum issue amount should not be less than 100 million yuan; 2) 
net assets should not be less than 2.5 billion yuan; 3) the company must have been continuously profitable 
and the weighted averaged ROE should not be less than 10 percent in the last three accounting years. 
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(Audretsch and Dohse, 2007). In 1979, China embarked on overall economic reform, 
opening up to the outside world. Since the 1980s, the Chinese government has established 
four Special Economic Zones and further opened up some coastal cities and regions. The 
government grants these cities and regions preferential policies, such as special tax incentives 
for foreign investment, greater autonomy when conducting international trade activities, 
greater fiscal autonomy, and favorable terms on loans and subsidies, with the objective of 
creating a favorable environment to attract foreign investment and promote infrastructure 
development, thereby stimulating market-oriented economic growth. Greatly aided by local 
economic booms, these cities and regions have gradually developed into the national center 
for science and technology as well as commerce and finance, the hub of talents and 
knowledge, and the modern industrial base. Given the policies aiming at enriching certain 
cities and regions, we would not expect the regional economy to experience the same level of 
enhancement in terms of productivity and growth, but instead expect the cities and regions 
that benefit the most from the policies to have a higher growth rate. To test the effect of 
location on firm dynamics, we group firms, based on their openness to the outside world, into 
the coastal region, the inner region, and the remote region. We use dummy variables to 
represent the three regions in the estimation. The remote region is used as the reference 
region. This region is characterized by heavy usage of traditional production, less developed 
technologies, and lack of social and human factors, compared to the other two regions (see 
Table 1 for details). 
   Table 2 presents size distributions by industry sectors and locations summarizing the 
idiosyncratic characteristics of Chinese listed SMEs. It is evident that more than half of the 
listed SMEs operate in Manufacturing, partly because China has become the largest 
manufacturing country in the world and the development of the SME sector is promoted by 
buoyant exports, and partly because Manufacturing holds the dominant position in Chinese 
industry. It is also noted that a significant percentage of large firms operate in Manufacturing 
(45%). Nevertheless, listed SMEs are active in the services industries (37%). It appears that 
more SMEs (23%) than large firms (15%) engage in innovative high-tech and R&D activities. 
In terms of size distribution by location, the majority of SMEs are located in the coastal 
region while those in the remote region account for the least, and large firms have a similar 
pattern. The general picture reveals that listed SMEs tend to be active in innovative high-tech 
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and R&D activities, operate in Manufacturing and the service industries, and congregate in 
the open, coastal region. 
Insert Table 2 here. 
      Table 3 presents medians and standard deviations of the key variables used in the 
econometric analyses. SMEs tend to be younger (7) and have a higher growth rate (3.23) and 
also higher business risk (0.84) compared to large firms. Not surprisingly, state ownership 
increases with firm size from 24.5 percent in SMEs to 34.6 percent in large firms. This is 
consistent with the fact that most large listed firms were originally SOEs. The percentage of 
shares held by non-state legal-person shareholders has an opposite trend, decreasing from 
26.7 percent in SMEs to 18.2 percent in large firms. Similarly, the percentage of tradable A-
shares decreases from 40.1 percent in SMEs to 32.6 percent in large firms. The ownership 
structure indicates that public shareholdings are a dominant feature of Chinese listed SMEs. 
Furthermore, the seasoned issues to market capitalization ratio is two times lower in SMEs 
(0.023) than in large firms (0.049), providing evidence that SMEs have raised far fewer 
seasoned funds to finance their corporate activities. 
Insert Table 3 here. 
4. Empirical Findings 
4.1  Firm’s Post-market Viability 
Figure 1 illustrates the viability rates of SMEs in comparison to large firms after their 
inception into the stock market. For the first two years, the estimated viability rates of SMEs 
maintain a similar level to those of large firms. From the third year onwards, the rates are 
below those of large firms throughout the period, and the difference increases as the viability 
rates of the two groups follow divergent paths over time. By the end of the fifth year, the 
viability rate of SMEs falls to 33 percent, while that of large firms is maintained at the 75 
percent level, indicating that 67 percent of SMEs incur losses in their first five years after 
market entry, while only 25 percent of large firms have such a problem. After ten years, the 
viability rate drops to 8 percent in SMEs and 50 percent in large firms, before plateauing. 
The overall results indicate that SMEs are more likely to incur losses than large firms, and 
their losses accumulate at an accelerating pace over the period. The Breslow log-rank test for 
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equality of survivor functions shows that 03.15921 =χ  (P<0.01). Therefore, the result does 
not support that the survival functions of SMEs and large firms are identical. 
Insert Figure 1 here. 
      The disparity in the viability of the two groups suggests that certain underlying factors 
have accounted for the heterogeneous probabilities of hazard confronting firms of different 
sizes. We will undertake the Cox regression to analyze the factors that may have underpinned 
the above findings. 
Insert Table 4 here. 
   Table 4 presents the results of analyzing survival-time data by the Cox regression for 
SMEs, large firms, and all firms. For the full sample, the hazard ratio on firm size (HR=1.44) 
is highly significant at the 5 percent level, providing evidence that SMEs face a significantly 
higher risk of transitioning to a non-viable state than their large counterparts. We also 
regressed on the continuous size variable defined as the logarithm of turnover and the 
logarithm of total assets of firm i in year t, respectively (not reported to reserve space). The 
results consistently show that firm size is negatively related to the likelihood of hazard 
occurring. Collectively, the regressions and the graphical analysis on the size effect are in 
agreement with most of the theoretical and empirical literature on firm dynamics. Given the 
significance of size in determining the firm’s post-market outcomes, we will conduct 
separate analyses for SMEs and large firms (control group) hereinafter, to explore the ways 
in which heterogeneous firm and industry characteristics and external conditions determining 
the firm’s post-market transition states vary with firm size. Firm viability is positively 
associated with firm age (HR=0.86), indicating that there is advantage bestowed as the firm 
gets older. Post-market growth protects firms from evolving to a non-viable state, which 
echoes the popular view that firms that do not grow or expand ultimately fail. There is a 
negative relationship between business risk and firm viability, which, thus, supports our 
hypothesis about the business risk-related cash flow effect. Firm viability decreases with 
state shares while increasing with non-state legal-person shares, but the relation between 
viability and A-shares has not been identified, although the hazard ratio is correctly signed. 
Industry-level innovative high-tech and R&D activities lead to higher firm viability, but the 
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impact is not overwhelming (HR=0.84). Firms operating in the capital-intensive industries, 
Mining and Quarrying, Manufacturing and Utility, are more likely to remain viable than 
those in the service industries, showing that length of survival is a function of industry 
characteristics associated with capital intensity. However, this result may only reflect the 
position of large firms, given their dominance in the population of listed firms, pointing out 
the need to look at the differential impacts of industry specifics by firm size. It reveals that 
the funds raised through seasoned financing are of importance in sustaining firm viability 
(HR=0.88). Further evidence shows that firms situated in the coastal region have a greater 
likelihood of transitioning to a non-viable state than those in the inner and remote regions. 
      The second and third columns in Table 4 present the effects of antecedents on the 
likelihood of the SME’s transition to the viable versus non-viable state in comparison to large 
firms. The viability of SMEs is positively correlated with firm age (HR=0.76), consistent 
with the view that learning-by-doing is an important determinant of firm survival (Jovanovic, 
1982; Sutton, 1997). However, for large firms, there is not much difference between younger 
firms and more mature ones (HR=0.94), due to the typical age structure of Chinese listed 
firms. Post-market growth has a significant, positive effect on SME viability, indicating that 
SMEs that have grown more rapidly have a better chance of remaining viable. This result 
lends support to the claim of Mata et al. (1995) that the rate at which smaller firms grow does 
matter in shaping their survival. However, the hazard ratio on large firms is not statistically 
significant. The insignificance indicates that large firms do not need to grow to survive. 
Rather, large firms, which are normally in the mature phase of the life cycle, can remain 
large and meanwhile avoid being confronted by a higher likelihood of hazard occurring by 
holding steady onto the niche market. When it comes to business risk, the cash flow effect 
prevails, showing that high business risk can threaten firm viability. The effect is more 
pronounced in SMEs (HR=1.45), suggesting that the capacity of SMEs to sustain the stability 
of cash flow is far more important than that of large firms. 
    Firm viability is significantly negatively correlated with tradable A-shares, confirming that 
diffused public ownership does not contribute to the viability of Chinese firms. As expected, 
the effect is stronger in SMEs where public ownership predominates. Non-state legal-person 
shares have a significant, positive impact on SME viability (HR=0.54) and, to a lesser degree, 
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the effect is also found in large firms (HR=0.66), demonstrating that an ownership structure 
composition with relative dominance of institutional shareholdings can effectively increase 
the firm’s post-market viability. Consistent with our hypothesis, state ownership has not 
made an impact on SMEs. However, it shows a modest, protective effect on the large firm 
cohort (HR=0.91). This result is not surprising. Large firms are ultimately controlled by the 
state and mainly operate in the strategic industries and shoulder social responsibilities in the 
national economy. If they run into cashflow or operational problems, the government would 
protect them by providing various financial support and/or changing senior management, as 
argued by Anderson et al. (2000) for the economies, like China, that lack market mechanisms 
and institutions. In the meantime, management would work collectively to save the firm from 
imminent trouble by improving operational efficiency. 
      Industry specifics show distinguished different effects on the firm’s post-market viability. 
SMEs operating in the capital-intensive industries, such as Mining and Quarrying (HR=1.27), 
Manufacturing (HR=1.23), and Construction (HR=1.12), have greater probabilities of 
transitioning to a non-viable state, but large firms do not experience such problems. The 
evidence supports the hypothesis of Jovanovic (1982) that it is more difficult for smaller 
firms to survive in the industries characterized by large units. On the contrary, SMEs find it 
much easier to remain viable in some of the service sectors, such as Wholesale and Retail 
Trade (HR=0.61) and Social Services (HR=0.69). These industries are less aggregated and 
less intensive in capital required to generate economies of scale, compared to those heavy 
industries. However, smaller establishments in Real Estate have a significantly higher hazard 
ratio (HR=1.22), while the opposite holds for large firms. The real estate sector in China is 
increasingly volatile and the estate market is plagued with big bubbles. This highlights that 
listed SMEs find it particularly hard to remain viable in volatile industries. What is 
noteworthy is that both SMEs and large firms in the innovative high-tech and R&D sector 
have greater post-market viability. This finding supports the views of Doms et al. (1995) and 
Agarwal and Audretsch (2001) that innovative conditions at the industry level do matter for 
the continuance of the firm. Their relative importance/more relevance to for SMEs highlights 
that the capability of Chinese SMEs to create and commercialize new knowledge is 
fundamental to their sustained competitiveness. Large firms in the Communication and 
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Culture industries are more likely to remain viable, but no evidence is found for SMEs. Firms 
in Conglomerates are confronted with a higher risk of evolving to a non-viable state, in 
particular SMEs (HR=1.38), suggesting that stepping up and focusing on the core business is 
important in securing the position of business and driving sustainable competitive advantage 
as soon as the firm enters the market. This evidence has important implications for 
management when formulating and designing business strategies. 
      The study confirms our hypothesis that seasoned financing is an important determinant of 
SME viability after they go public, and it is noted that seasoned funds have a larger impact 
than any other variables in the regression (HR=0.42), highlighting the importance of equity 
capital for SMEs in their continuance in the market. This leads us to believe that any 
disruptions in their financing activities can be detrimental to the sustainability of SMEs. But 
there is not much evidence that seasoned funds exert an influence on the viability of large 
firms, suggesting that large firms have other financing channels than the stock market, and 
hence do not rely upon equity capital to survive.  
      The study reveals the importance of location in firm viability. The hazard probability of 
SMEs in the coastal region is apparently higher (HR=1.25) than that of those in more remote 
parts of China. SMEs in the coastal region operate in an open economic environment, facing 
pronounced competition and being exposed to strong market fluctuations, which poses a 
threat to their viability. In the inner region and particularly in the remote region, local 
governments are protective of existing firms and have established administrative and 
structural barriers to entry. SMEs in these regions are more oriented towards serving local 
markets, and therefore tend to escape some of the survival risks faced by those in the more 
outward-oriented regions. However, statistical insignificance on the hazard ratio for large 
firms indicates that location is not a determinant of large firm viability, providing further 
evidence that size is important in explaining SME dynamics in China.  
  
4.2  Firm’s Post-market Growth 
Table 5 presents the results of the post-market growth analysis. We carried out Hausman 
tests to choose the model for estimation, and the results accepted the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients estimated by the efficient random effects estimator are the same as those 
  
23
estimated by the consistent fixed effects estimator (p>0.05) for the full sample and the two 
size groups. Therefore, we report the results of the random effects model. In all the three 
cases, the coefficients on the lagged dependent growth variable are negative and consistently 
indicate that firm growth adjusts gradually towards convergence. The regression for the full 
sample shows a significant, negative size impact on firm growth. This evidence refutes 
Gibrat’s Law and reflects the distinguished features of Chinese listed SMEs. Differentiating 
themselves from large competitors, SMEs tend to have more flexibility in managing 
increases in the complexity arising from operating, investing, and financing activities and 
more capacity to adapt themselves to the changing market, so as to find it quicker to 
capitalize on growth opportunities and easier to overcome obstacles constraining their growth. 
Their growth is further aided by government policies and the revolutionary transformation of 
the economy in favor of SME development over the last two decades. Consistent with other 
studies, the older the firms are, the less likely they are to grow. Business risk is positively 
related to the firm’s post-market growth, supporting our agency argument that lower business 
risk is counter to firm growth. 
      We have also identified the opposite effects of state ownership and non-state legal-person 
shares on firm growth; however, there is no evidence that firm growth is correlated with 
tradable A-shares. These results are largely consistent with the findings from the recent 
studies of Xu and Wang (1999) that examine the effects of ownership structure on firm 
performance. The firms operating in the capital-intensive industries, in general, experience 
higher growth rates than those in other industries. Most notably, the role of industry-level 
innovation and R&D is modest. The evidence does not provide strong support for most of the 
previous literature that stresses the role of innovation and R&D in firm growth. In line with 
prior expectations, seasoned financing plays a positive role in explaining the growth 
prospects of Chinese firms. Furthermore, the firms located in the coastal region grow more 
rapidly than their remote counterparts. 
      We further group the firms into SMEs and large firms to observe the ways in which the 
impacts of these factors on firm growth vary with firm size. The results are presented in the 
second and third columns in Table 5. Firm growth is negatively correlated with firm age, 
with a similar effect on both groups. Younger SME entrants into the capital market are 
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generally the leaders in their own line of business, with strong growth potential, while 
younger large firms tend to be blue chips with distinct advantages in economies of scale and 
market power. It is significant that business risk has the opposite effects on SMEs and their 
large counterparts. Higher business risk augments SME growth, demonstrating that SMEs 
facing high uncertainty in returns are more likely to exploit growth opportunities. However, 
the negative effect on large firms, in all likelihood, indicates that agency costs are responsible 
for low firm growth. Large listed firms in China are majorly owned by the state and operate 
in the strategic industries, and have historically been a vital instrument for provision of social 
services, such as employment, housing, medical care, and pensions, and an instrument of 
state policy, such as stabilization of the national economy. To fulfill their public function, 
large firms purposely restrain cash flow fluctuations at the expense of firm growth. 
      As expected, tradable A-shares have negative impacts on firm growth. The negative 
effect is more substantial in SMEs, suggesting that public shareholders of SMEs bear few 
duties in monitoring management to ensure that the firm is run in their best interests. Non-
state legal-person shares play a significant role in promoting firm growth of both groups, 
confirming that the functioning of institutional shareholdings is conducive to developing 
better monitoring that steers managers in the pursuit of long-run value creation. Consistent 
with the existing literature on the defects of governmental interference in corporate 
governance, the state ownership regime has had a detrimental impact on firm growth, and the 
impact is stronger on large firms than on SMEs. Even though state ownership tends to mean 
protection for the large firms, as shown in the survival analysis, the negative effect highlights 
that firms that seek long-term growth need genuinely to improve internal management 
incentives so that economic activities are better undertaken, instead of relying on external, 
short-term government support as their last resort.  
      Further results show that SMEs in the capital-intensive industries, i.e., Manufacturing and 
Construction, and the service industries, i.e., Transportation and Warehousing, Wholesaling 
and Retailing Trade, Social Services, and Real Estate experience higher growth rates 
compared to those in Agriculture and in other industries. The statistical significance of SME 
growth in Manufacturing and Construction indicates that once SMEs are able to survive in 
the capital-intensive industries, they have a greater propensity to grow (Doms et al., 1995). 
  
25
Moreover, SMEs in Manufacturing produce the daily goods that are most needed and durable 
products to meet increasing market demand, largely attributable to the expanding domestic 
market and booming exports, which, in turn, boosts SME growth. The service sector – the 
fastest growing sector in China since the economic reform in 1979 – provides much-
demanded services for consumers. The greater magnitude of the coefficients on the service 
industries than on the capital-intensive ones highlights that SMEs find it easier to grow in the 
expanding service sector than through gaining competitive advantage over their large 
competitors in the heavy industries that require a higher minimum efficient scale level. The 
industry effect on SME growth can also be attributable to the government policies in recent 
years, which aim to create an enabling environment for SMEs in the service industries. This 
includes widening market access, implementing preferential tax rates and flexibility, 
channeling funds to the service sector, increasing credit support services, and promoting 
rational prices for land use, water, gas, and electricity in the service industries (Zhou and 
Ouyang, 2008). With respect to Transportation and Warehousing, thanks to the government 
industry policy targeted at transforming traditional transportation and warehousing into the 
modern logistics industry, this sector is rapidly expanding into new realms by creating added 
value through the provision of processing and assembly services and enlarged means of 
transportation for more efficient deliveries. In terms of large firms, industries with heavy 
fixed assets stand out. Mining, Construction, Utility, and Manufacturing, which are capital 
intensive and engage in a high level of production, contribute more significantly to the 
growth of large firms than other industries. The result lends support to Audretsch’s (1995) 
claim that firms which are more capital intensive often grow faster. Notwithstanding this, 
large firms hold monopoly positions in the strategic industries, i.e., Utility, Construction, and 
Mining. Not only can they exploit economies of scales and develop cost advantages over 
millions of minnows, but also they often receive extensive protection and support from the 
government, given their importance to the national economy. 
      Most notably, the effect of industry-level innovative high-tech and R&D is of much less 
significance for both groups, compared to the other effects on firm growth. This result is 
seemingly inconsistent with previous studies on the innovation and R&D effects, but 
arguably reflects the adverse innovative environment relating to copyright protections that 
the high-tech industries are facing in China. The large influx of cheap, low quality 
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counterfeits and piracy hurts innovative high-tech and R&D-active firms by limiting the 
market demand for legitimate products and destroying the goodwill for products that rely on 
reputation and quality. Although such laws as the Trademark Law, the Patent Law, and the 
Copyright Law are in place to protect intellectual properties, they are far from complete, 
leaving the Chinese market to the pirates who fill the void. The enforcement of such laws has 
been inadequate and ineffective as the standard law enforcement devices and the court 
system are still subject to bureaucratic administration controls, and have, hence, failed to 
crack down on counterfeits and tackle piracy. There is more cause to believe that listed SMEs 
suffer the most from counterfeiting, as nearly one-quarter of SMEs are active in innovative 
high-tech and R&D activities (see Table 2). SME brands have to compete with fakes on price, 
with the fakes normally winning out, since consumers would rather buy counterfeits of SME 
brands at a cheaper price or buy counterfeits of famous brands at the same price as authentic 
SME brands. In both circumstances, SMEs either lose potential sales to piracy or are unable 
to sell enough new products to prosper. The inability to deliver full benefits to innovative 
high-tech and R&D-active firms has caused a great deal of disturbance to their full 
commitment to innovating cutting-edge products and introducing new production practices, 
which subsequently hobbles their development. 
      Seasoned financing describing the financing role of the stock market produces striking 
results. Its contribution to SME growth is minimal and marginally significant )09.0( =β . 
This result contrasts with the widely shared perception that equity capital is crucial to SME 
development (La Porta et al., 1997), indicating that China’s equity market plays an 
insignificant role in sustaining the post-market growth of SMEs. One of the advantages of 
going public is to gain access to much-needed equity funds. If access is restrained as a 
consequence of the stringent seasoned issue requirements, listed SMEs are no better 
positioned than those that remained private in tapping additional channels of finance. 
Furthermore, inadequate market infrastructure and an inefficient capital market wracked with 
stock price manipulation and insider trading encourage short-term churn and speculation, 
thereby rendering stock prices highly volatile and equity finance unstable as a source of 
external finance. The role of seasoned funds is further undermined by misallocation of gross 
proceeds. Instead of investing the proceeds in the projects in agreement with the published 
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issue prospectuses, many listed firms misappropriate the funds for non-productive purposes 
or tunnel them to benefit the parent companies (Shirai, 2004). Issuing firms frequently 
change, without authorization, the use of proceeds specified in the prospectus or do not 
submit the change to the shareholders’ general meeting for approval (Jin et al., 2002). This 
observation is substantiated by the evidence that seasoned financing has a marginal impact 
on the growth of large firms too, where managerial discretional behavior over gross proceeds 
is believed to be substantial, in that the majority of large firms are parent-controlled. These 
results lead one to conclude that China’s capital market has not sufficiently fulfilled the role 
expected of it as the channel through which firm growth can be sustained. 
      The results further show that the firms in the coastal region, small or large, experience 
higher growth rates compared to those in the inner and remote regions, suggesting that 
preferential policies and strategic measures have had a direct effect on firm growth by 
creating an environment that is more conducive to production and more responsive to market 
concerns. In comparison, the remote regions are still handicapped by less favorable locational 
attributes featured by the usage of traditional production and lack of infrastructure and social 
and human factors. Although it is a common belief that China has experienced broad-based 
growth in the course of market economic reform, this study sheds light on the discrepancies 
and imbalance between regional growth rates, and is qualitatively similar to the previous 
studies that examine regional inequality (Chen and Fleisher, 1996; Yao and Zhang, 2001). In 
2000, the Chinese government launched the “Go West Campaign” and started shifting the 
focus of economic construction from the coastal region to the inner region and especially to 
the remote, western region. However, the economy of West China still lags far behind the 
rest of the nation, and it will take time for the new strategic shift to take effect before the 
infrastructure, markets, and economic order become well-placed. More notably, the location 
effect is more significant for SMEs than for their large counterparts in the coastal region, 
highlighting the importance of the open economic policy in promoting SME development in 
this region. This is confirmed by the report published by the National Development and 
Reform Commission on the top 500 growing SMEs in China that SMEs in the coastal regions 
show much stronger growth opportunities, accounting for 61.81 percent of all the growing 
SMEs in China. The evidence on the importance of location attributes in firm growth is 
important from the economic policy perspective. 
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Insert Table 5 here.  
5. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
This study uses an integrated approach to examine the dynamics of Chinese listed SMEs with 
respect to their post-market viability and growth after going public on the basis of national 
firm-level data. The KM analysis shows that SMEs have a higher risk of evolving to a non-
viable state subsequent to market entry, compared to large firms. This study goes on to 
explore the ways in which the idiosyncratic firm and industry specifics and the underlying 
financing environment and institutional conditions shape SME dynamics. Three important 
conclusions follow on from our study. First, SME dynamics are determined by firm specifics. 
Post-market viability is aided by firm growth and merited by the firm’s ability to compete 
through learning along with age, while post-market growth is constrained by inactivism and 
free-riding problems associated with a dispersed public ownership structure. The nexus 
between business risk and SME dynamics supports our cash flow and agency arguments that 
higher business risk is counter to SME viability but beneficial to SME growth. Second, 
industry specifics shape the conditions for SME dynamics. SMEs are less likely to remain 
viable in capital-intensive industries or volatile ones, but once they are able to survive in 
these industries, they have a greater propensity to grow. Furthermore, SMEs have a strong 
tendency to remain viable and grow in service industries, largely due to the government 
policies in support of the service sector in the last two decades. However, the inefficient 
infrastructure to protect the economic interests of innovative high-tech and R&D-active firms 
has deterred these firms from attaining substantial growth. Our results do not support listed 
SMEs diversifying their business at market entry; instead they should concentrate on the core 
business. Third, the external business environment is crucial to SME dynamics. Given 
stringent issue arrangements and agency problems associated with seasoned financing, the 
capital market is yet to develop into the financing channel through which SMEs are able to 
thrive. The economic value of location derived from government initiatives for strategic 
development in the coastal region has become the key source of SME growth in this region. 
This study fills the significant gap in the literature by identifying the factors that influence 
firms’ post-market transition to either a non-viable state or a growth state in the context of 
the emerging economies where the market economy has just begun to take hold and the 
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institutional infrastructure is far from perfect. 
      The study raises the issue of seasoned financing that merits policy discussion. The 
difficulty in raising funds is a long-term bottleneck that hampers the development of SMEs. 
The majority of SMEs find it too difficult to qualify for initial public offerings on the Main 
Board or on the SME Board due to the strict criteria for market entry. Their financing 
environment is worsening, as new evidence from this study suggests that the lack of seasoned 
funds as a result of stringent issue requirements has hindered those SMEs with growth 
prospects from developing to their full strength. This argument is supported by the survey 
conducted by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 2006 on seasoned finance practice, reporting 
that 80 percent of listed SMEs in the questionnaires think that the criteria for seasoned equity 
offerings are too strict and that the procedures are too lengthy and complicated. It is arguable 
that more reforms in the capital market may have further limited its role in meeting the 
demands of SMEs for equity capital. To enable SMEs to fulfill their potential, the CSRC 
needs to reform the approach to financing the SME sector in several ways. The first is to 
adopt measures to gradually expand the scale of the SME Board to effectively finance 
growth-seeking SMEs. Second, to press forward with innovations in seasoned financing. In 
view of the fact that many SMEs often need ready capital to finance their prosperous projects 
at affordable costs or to upgrade their products every few years, fast track and more flexible 
criteria need to be designed in favor of SMEs in an attempt to reduce issue costs and waiting 
time. For instance, offers and sales of a small quantity of securities that satisfy certain 
conditions by an issuer, usually an SME, could be exempted from registration procedures. 
Third, to continue to implement ex ante supervision over seasoned issues and ex post use of 
issue proceeds. Supervision serves as the lifeline for China’s capital markets, especially when 
the market infrastructure is not properly in place and the vast majority of firms are poorly 
governed with incomplete internal management and irregular financial operations. Targeted 
at sustaining SME development, these recommended policies are a necessary complement to 
the overall reform in promoting a healthy, stable capital market that avails capital to firms at 
all stages of growth. 
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Table 1. Descriptions of the variables used in the estimations 
Variable Definition and coding 
Firm specifics  
Firm size 
(large firm size: reference size) 
 
 
A firm is classified as a SME if it is officially listed on the SME Board of the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange; or 2) if the total number of shares outstanding is less 
than 200,000,000 shares and the total number of tradable shares outstanding is less 
than 50,000,000 shares in an individual year; otherwise it is large.  
Firm size is coded as 1 if a firm is small and medium-sized, or 0 if it is large.   
Firm age the life years of a firm in each calendar year since the listing year 
Post-market growth rate annual growth rate in total assets of firm i in year t adjusted by the calendar-year and 
industry-specific GDP growth index 
Business risk the standard deviation of residuals in the market model as given by Equation 4 
Ownership structure   
    State ownership the ratio of state shares consisting of both state shares and state legal-person shares 
to total shares outstanding of firm i in year t 
Non-state legal-person  
ownership 
the ratio of non-state legal-person shares to total shares outstanding of firm i in year 
t 
   A-share ownership the ratio of tradable A-shares to total shares outstanding of firm i in year t 
Industry specifics  
Primary sector  
Agriculture  
(reference industry) 
any firm within section A (Farming, Forestry, Animal, Husbandry, or Fishery) 
coded as 1, or 0 otherwise 
Secondary sector (capital-intensive) 
Mining any firm within section B (Mining) coded as 1, or 0 otherwise 
Manufacturing any firm within section C (Manufacturing), except division C5 (Electronics) and 
division C8 (Medicine and Biological Products), coded as 1, or 0 otherwise 
Utilities any firm within section D (Utilities) coded as 1, or 0 otherwise 
Construction any firm within section E (Construction) coded as 1, or 0 otherwise 
Tertiary sector (less capital-incentive) 
Transportation and 
Warehousing 
any firm within section F (Transportation and Warehousing) coded as 1, or 0 
otherwise 
Wholesale and Retail Trade any firm within section H (Wholesale and Retail Trade) coded as 1, or 0 otherwise 
Real Estate any firm within section J (Real Estate) coded as 1, or 0 otherwise 
Social Services any firm within section K (Social Services), excluding division K20 (Professional, 
Scientific Research Services), coded as 1, or 0 otherwise 
Communication and Cultural 
Industries 
any firm within section L (Communication and Cultural Industries) coded as 1, or 0 
otherwise 
Conglomerates any firm within section M (Conglomerates) coded as 1, or 0 otherwise 
Innovative high-tech and 
R&D sector 
any firm within section G (Information Technology), division C5 (Electronics), 
division C8 (Medicine and Biological Products) and division K20 (Professional, 
Scientific Research Services) coded as 1, or 0 otherwise 
External factors  
Seasoned financing gross proceeds raised through rights issues, cash offers and convertible bonds over 
its market capitalization at the accounting year end preceding the issue 
Location  
    Remote region 
 (reference region) 
A firm is coded as 1 if situated in the remote region, which contains the provinces in 
the north-western China, that is, Ningxia, Qinghai, Gansu, Inner Mongolia, Tibet 
and Xinjiang, and those in the south-western China, that is, Guizhou and Yunnan, or 
0 otherwise. 
    Inner region A firm is coded as 1 if situated in the inner region, which contains Heilongjiang, 
Jilin, Shanxi, Shannxi, Henan, Anhui and Jiangxi, or 0 otherwise. 
    Coastal region A firm is coded as 1 if situated in the coastal region, which contains Special 
Economic Zones, 14 open coastal cities and areas, open costal belts, all the capital 
cities of provinces and autonomous regions and direct-controlled municipalities, or 0 
otherwise. 
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Table 2. Distributions by industry sector and location for SMEs and large firms 
 SMEs              Large firms 
  No. (%)             No. (%) 
Industry sector   
Primary sector   
    Agriculture 9   (2.35) 33   (2.78) 
Secondary sector (capital-intensive)   
    Mining 5   (1.31) 36   (2.86) 
    Manufacturing 213 (55.61) 536 (45.12) 
    Utilities 8   (2.09) 57   (4.63) 
    Construction 9   (1.83) 31   (2.44) 
 Sub-total 233 (60.84) 654  (55.05) 
Tertiary sector (less capital-incentive)   
    Transportation and Warehousing 4   (1.04) 65   (4.97) 
    Wholesale and Retail Trade 17   (4.44) 82   (6.23) 
    Real Estate 7   (1.83) 74   (5.89) 
    Social Services 9   (2.35) 36   (3.03) 
    Communication and Cultural Industries 3   (0.78) 11   (0.93) 
    Conglomerates 12   (3.13) 70   (5.64) 
    Innovative high-tech and R&D sector 89 (23.24) 184 (15.49) 
    Sub-total 141 (36.81) 501 (42.17) 
Total 383    (100) 1,188    (100) 
Location   
    Coastal region   302 (66.25) 791 (77.84)  
    Inner region 57 (24.04) 287 (14.69)  
    Remote region        29   (9.72)     116   (7.47)  
Total 388    (100) 1,194    (100) 
Note: the total number of SMEs and large firms by industry sector and location do not match due to different 
missing values in each of the categories. 
Data source: CSMAR Financial Database, Guo Tai An Information Technology Company Ltd, 2009. 
 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of the key variables in the estimations 
  Age 
(year) 
Growth 
rate 
Business 
risk 
State 
shares 
Non-state Legal-
person shares 
A shares Seasoned 
financing* 
All firms 8 2.937 0.741 0.293 0.232 0.345 0.047 
 (7.03) (2.23) (0.93) (0.31) (0.25) (0.48) (0.09) 
SMEs 7 3.229 0.836 0.245 0.267 0.401 0.023 
 (6.15) (3.06) (1.16) (0.22) (0.34) (0.36) (0.06) 
Large firms 8 2.917 0.419 0.346 0.182 0.327 0.049 
  (8.24) (3.11) (0.68) (0.29) (0.27) (0.35) (0.12) 
The reported values are median values, and standard deviations are presented in parentheses. 
Note: a listed firm has more types of ownership than shown in this Table. Therefore, the total percentage of the three 
types of ownership in the Table is not summed up to 100%.  
*: the mean value of seasoned financing is reported, as the median value is zero for both size categories. Just over 
half of the listed firms have never raised seasoned funds. 
Data sources: CSMAR Financial Database, Guo Tai An Information Technology Company Ltd, 2009. 
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Figure 1. Kaplan-Meier survival curves for SMEs and large firms 
         
Note: the vertical axis represents the survival rates of firms; the horizontal axis denotes elapsed time in 
years after the firm is listed on the stock exchange when t=0. 
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Table 4. Hazard ratio estimation using the Cox-model 
Explanatory variable All firms SMEs Large firms 
Firm specifics    
   Firm size (large) (reference) 1 — — 
 Firm size (SME) 1.436*** — — 
 (0.122)  — — 
0.856* 0.764** 0.941*  Firm age 
(0.076) (0.102) (0.034) 
0.663* 0.484*** 0.616  Post-market growth 
(0.141) (0.127) (0.231) 
1.317** 1.445*** 1.186*  Business risk 
(0.164)  (0.199) (0.107) 
1.093* 1.125 0.913*  State shares  
(0.056) (0.146) (0.047) 
 Non-state legal-person shares 0.571** 0.535** 0.659** 
  (0.162) (0.162) (0.203) 
1.144 1.367** 1.187*  A shares 
(0.309) (0.206) (0.116) 
Industry specifics    
Agriculture (reference) 1 1 1 
 Mining  and Quarrying 0.530** 1.272* 0.827** 
  (0.158) (0.167) (0.79) 
 Manufacturing 0.454** 1.226** 0.408*** 
 (0.183) (0.127) (0.161) 
 Utility 0.635* 0.958 0.687* 
 (0.155) (0.264) (0.135) 
 Construction 0.579 1.123** 0.634* 
 (0.253) (0.063) (0.176) 
 Transportation and Warehousing 0.616* 0.742* 0.691* 
 (0.172) (0.117) (0.148) 
 Wholesale and Retail Trade 0.726* 0.607** 0.673** 
 (0.121) (0.138) (0.132) 
 Real Estate 0.746* 1.215** 0.864** 
 (0.114) (0.109) (0.055) 
 Social Services 0.753 0.692** 0.796 
 (0.317) (0.127) (0.139) 
Communication and Cultural  Industries 0.959 0.814 0.783* 
 (0.352) (0.271) (0.115) 
 Conglomerates 1.258* 1.383** 1.331* 
 (0.149) (0.227) (0.208) 
 High-tech and R&D 0.839* 0.473** 0.577** 
 (0.088) (0.175) (0.146) 
External factors    
0.877* 0.422** 0.936* Seasoned financing 
(0.068) (0.173) (0.037) 
Remote region (reference) 1 1 1 
0.721* 0.628* 0.773 Inner region 
(0.126) (0.165) (0.215) 
1.158* 1.254** 1.087 Coastal region 
(0.094)  (0.142) (0.122) 
No. of observations (firm years) 11,341 3,879 7,462 
Wald test     21.606220 =χ  
P < 0.01 
        475.34 219 =χ  
P < 0.01 
        13.421219 =χ   
P < 0.01 
Note. The reported values are hazard ratios; robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
*(**, ***) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 10% (5%, 1%) significance level. 
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Table 5. Random effects model regression on post-market growth 
Explanatory variable   All firms SMEs Large firms 
Lagged growth rate -0.096** -0.111*** -0.073** 
 (0.046) (0.035) (0.039) 
Firm specifics     
-0.473*** — —     Firm size  (SME) 
(0.145) — — 
    Firm age -0.343** -0.364** -0.351* 
 (0.167) (0.171) (0.180) 
    Business risk 0.236** 0.374** 0.229* 
 (0.108) (0.175) (0.128) 
    State shares -0.306* -0.278* -0.386** 
 (0.161) (0.156) (0.184) 
    Non-state legal-person shares 0.322** 0.374** 0.366* 
 (0.153) (0.172) (0.208) 
-0.283 -0.427*** -0.313*     A shares 
(0.194) (0.124) (0.169) 
Industry specifics    
0.301** 0.146 0.378**     Mining  and Quarrying 
(0.135) (0.122) (0.182) 
    Manufacturing 0.413** 0.323** 0.207* 
 (0.195) (0.161) (0.118) 
    Utility 0.307* 0.289 0.357** 
 (0.181) (0.196) (0.174) 
    Construction 0.359* 0.235* 0.349** 
 (0.201) (0.139) (0.157) 
    Transportation and Warehousing 0.418** 0.512** 0.326** 
 (0.204) (0.243) (0.154) 
    Wholesale and Retail Trade 0.367* 0.479** 0.177 
 (0.195) (0.235) (0.145) 
    Real Estate 0.156* 0.368* 0.187* 
 (0.085) (0.214) (0.099) 
    Social Services 0.275 0.364* 0.328* 
 (0.212) (0.186) (0.173) 
    Communication and Cultural  Industries 0.325** — 0.341** 
 (0.154) — (0.166) 
    Conglomerates  0.239 0.149 0.221 
 (0.162) (0.151) (0.143) 
    Hi-tech and R&D 0.149* 0.135* 0.151* 
 (0.083) (0.073) (0.089) 
External factors    
    Seasoned financing 0.127* 0.094* 0.112* 
 (0.068) (0.054) (0.065) 
    Inner region   0.234* 0.307* 0.214* 
 (0.132) (0.181) (0.119) 
    Coastal region  0.418** 0.442** 0.378** 
 (0.203) (0.225) (0.192) 
No. of observations (firm years) 11,019 3,673 7,346 
Wald test         .05287220 =χ  
P < 0.01 
        159.36218 =χ  
P < 0.01 
    252.03 219 =χ  
P < 0.01 
Note. The reported values are regression coefficients. Standard errors are presented in parentheses.  
*(**, ***) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 10% (5%, 1%) significance level. 
Large firms, Agriculture and Remote region are used as references in the estimation and not shown in the Table. 
The dummy variable for Communication and Cultural Industries was dropped from the estimation due to 
insufficient observations for SMEs. 
